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RULEMAKING CASE
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WILLIAM H. TOWLE***
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of using a rail-carrier flatcar to transport a motor-
carrier trailer for a portion of the latter's designated journey has only
recently become a factor of major economic importance. This practice
is commonly referred to as "trailer-on-flatcar" (TOFC) service, or
"piggyback" service' The use of "piggyback" or TOFC transportation
has proven to be beneficial to rail carriers and in fact, has allowed the
railroads to retain and develop a large volume of traffic which might
otherwise have been lost to both motor common carriers and, increas-
ingly, to shippers who had developed their own trucking fleets? The
Interstate Commerce Commission which is responsible for the regula-
tion of trailer-on-flatcar operations has stated that the
rapid growth of piggyback has been largely the result of its
effectiveness in meeting the need for coordinated rail and
motor services. Piggyback combines the advantages of move-
ment by truck with the long-haul economies of rail or water
transport, under conditions which hold total expense to a
minimum.3
While the "piggyback" concept has created a new degree of
coordination between motor and rail carriers, it was not a significant
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1 For a concise history of the beginnings of TOFC see Anderson & Loos, Piggyback
Plans, 3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 335 (1962).
2 See E. Zane, Trailer-on-Flatcar: An Economic Analysis of Piggyback Transporta-
tion in New England 1 (Research Report (No. 27) to Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
1964).
8 ICC Statement 66-1, Piggyback Traffic Characteristics (1966). See also Merrill
J. Roberts & Assoc., Intermodal Freight Transportation Coordination: Problems and
Potential (Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, 1967).
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segment of the interstate commerce picture at the time regulatory
legislation was being drafted, causing serious questions later to arise
regarding its regulation. Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act,'
setting forth provisions for the regulation of common carriers by
rail, was enacted in February of 1887 and was, until 1935, the whole
body of that Act. The Motor Carrier Act of August, 1935, subsequently
included as Part II of the Act,' sets forth the provisions for regulation
of motor carriers. Since the Act regulates these two modes of transpor-
tation separately and does not interrelate the regulation of different
modes, uncertainty arose as to how to regulate TOFC—a combination
of these two separate modes. This controversial issue demanded resolu-
tion. In 1964, the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated a set
of eight rules in an effort to resolve the controversy and to establish
standards which would provide a degree of continuity while remaining
flexible enough to allow for future growth and innovation.' This article
will offer a discussion of these rules, the controversy which they have
provoked, and the significant litigation resulting therefrom.
A. Piggyback Service Provided Under Five Plans
Basically, piggyback service has been thought of as rail service,
and has been discussed and utilized in terms of five different plans of
operation.'
1. Plan I. This involves railroad movement, as a substituted
service,' of trailers or containers owned by motor common carriers,
with the motor carrier dealing with both consignors and consignees of
shipments; performing service to and from the rail-loading and -unload-
ing areas, and billing the freight under rates in regular motor-carrier
tariffs. The shipper has the option to direct that substituted service not
be used. Payments to the rail carrier for the substituted service often
are stated as flat charges per trailer.
2. Plan II. In this plan, the railroad offers a complete service
between the loading docks of shippers and receivers in the terminal
areas. The line-haul transportation is performed by the railroad which
also supplies the terminal-area services of pick-up and delivery, pro-
viding both trailers and flatcars. Charges for this TOFC service are
4 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1964), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 5, 20 (Supp. II 1965-66).
5 49 Stat. 544 (1935), as amended, 49 US.C. §§ 1-27 (1964), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 302, 304-05, 308, 312, 314, 322 (Supp. II 1685 -66).
6 Substituted Service—Charges and Practices of For-Hire Carriers and Freight
Forwarders (hereinafter referred to as Ex Parte 230), 322 I.C.C. 301 (1964).
7 Id. at 304-05, 309-12.
8 "Substituted service" is a phrase which also connotes things other than the particular
service described in Plan I and these other meanings will not be touched upon in discussion
of the ICC "piggyback" proceeding. See Anderson, Black Diamond and the Concept of
Railroad Substituted Service Authority, 33 ICC Prac. J. 159 (1965).
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based on railroad published rates and often duplicate motor-carrier
rates because plan II was directed specifically at meeting competition
from that mode.°
3. Plan III. The railroad furnishes the flatcars, performs the
line-haul service, and loads and unloads the trailers, which are owned
or leased by the shipper or freight forwarder. Transportation of the
trailer to and from the rail-loading and -unloading areas is the responsi-
bility of the shipper or forwarder, while the railroad is responsible for
placing the loads on and removing them from the cars. Plan III rates
are generally based on a fiat charge.
4. Plan IV. Plan IV is much like III but differs in that the flatcar,
as well as the trailer, is supplied by the shipper or freight forwarder
and placing the trailers on and removing them from the flatcar is the
responsibility of the shipper or forwarder. The railroad, however, may
provide this loading service at a published charge Rail rates apply to
trailers, loaded or empty, on the shipper's flatcar. Plan IV rates have
been constructed at levels below plan III rates to allow for the ex-
pense of flatcar ownership.
5. Plan V. This plan is the counterpart of plan I. Service is based
on through-route'° and joint-rate coordination of rail and motor car-
riers. Traffic is routed intermodally, but, unlike plan I, no option is
given the shipper of using or not using a substituted mode. Either carrier
may solicit traffic for through movement. Arrangements may be for
the entire length of a given haul or for part only with return to the
originating carrier at some intermediate point.
B. The Need for a Rulemaking Proceeding
The Interstate Commerce Commission, on June 29, 1962, in-
stituted its second general investigation into piggyback service" and it
9 Plan II 1/2. A variation of plan II where the trailers are owned by the rail-
roads, but consignors and consignees must move the trailers between the ramp
sites and their warehouses and also perform the loading and unloading. The
consignor must accept the empty trailers at a location immediately adjacent to
the carrier's loading ramp at origin, assume the loading expense, and deliver the
loaded trailers to the carrier at the same location. The consignee must accept
delivery of the loaded trailer from the carrier at a location immediately ad-
jacent to the carrier's unloading ramp at destination, assume the unloading ex-
pense and return the empty trailer or container to the carrier at the same location.
ICC Statement 66-1, supra note 3, at 5.
10 In Thompson v. United States, 343 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1952), the Supreme Court
defined a "through route" as "an arrangement, express or implied, between connecting
railroads for the continuous carriage of goods from the originating point on the line of
one carrier to destination on the line of another.... Through Routes and Through Rates,
12 I,C.C. 164, 166 (1907)." With the advent of significant motor-rail piggyback opera-
tions this term has been applied to continuous carriage of goods by a combination of
motor and rail carriers.
11 The Interstate Commerce Act gives the Commission the authority to "inquire into
and report on the management of the business of all common carriers" and "obtain from
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was this investigation, including therein a realignment of existing pre-
cedents and practices, which led to the adoption of eight rules "found
necessary to regulate coordinated and substituted service transportation
in the public interest."" At a prehearing conference held in the in-
vestigation, a series of proposed rules were distributed. These were
designed to serve as a framework upon which rules ultimately to be
adopted could be developed. The proposed rules represented something
of a new approach to TOFC terminology—a recognition of the bimodal
character of piggyback service. They attempted to separate TOFC
service into two basic classes, without regard to the five plans then and
now in common usage One class was termed "intermodal" TOFC
service, essentially involving traffic moving pursuant to a negotiated
agreement between carriers of different modes. The other class was
"all-rail" TOFC service, which would include any piggyback service
in which traffic moves exclusively at rail rates and on rail billing. The
Commission's examiners, in their report and recommended order,
recognized the "joint intermodal" and "all-rail" divisions, but chose also
to retain the five plans. Consequently, plans I and V are now classed as
"joint intermodal" and plans II, III, and IV are classed as "all-rail."
The heart of the controversy concerning the new ICC rules has been
this new characterization of TOFC service as bimodal rather than
solely rail service."
II. RULES 2 AND 3: THE OPEN-TARIFF REQUIREMENTS
In Ex Parte 230, before setting forth the basic bimodal concept in
rules 2 and 3, the Commission defined TOFC service in rule 1 which
was to serve as a foundation for the remainder of the rules.
Trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) service means the transporta-
tion on a rail car, in interstate or foreign commerce, of (a)
any freight-laden highway truck, trailer, or semitrailer (or the
container portion of any highway truck, trailer, or semi-
trailer having a demountable chassis); or (b) any empty
highway truck, trailer, or semitrailer (or the container por-
tion . . .) when such empty equipment is being transported
incidental to its prior or subsequent use in TOFC service .
such carriers . . . such information as the Commission deems necessary to carry out the
provisions of [the Act]." 49 U.S.C. § 12(1) (1964). The first TOFC investigation con-
ducted by the Commission is reported in the so-called New Haven case, Movement of
Highway Trailers by Rail, 293 I.C.C. 93 (1954).
12 Ex Parte 230, 322 I.C.C. at 303. A rulemaking proceeding was chosen by the
Commission in order to facilitate the gathering of information and to avoid the in-
efficiencies involved in solving fundamental piggyback problems on a case-by-case
approach.
13 For a general discussion of the initial proposals in this rulemaking proceeding see
Ex Parte 230, 322 I.C.C. at 319-21.
14 49 C.F.R. § 500.1 (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 327.
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Rules 2 and 3 are the most significant of the eight new rules, as
they set down new piggyback policy and requirements, and overturn
many of the Commission's past decisions!' Rule 2 is a statement of the
common-carrier obligation of railroads as it relates to trailer-on-flatcar
service.
Availability to all of TOFC service.—TOFC service, if
offered by a rail carrier through its open-tariff publications,
shall be made available to any person at a charge no greater
and no less than that received from any other person or per-
sons for doing for him or them a like and contemporaneous
service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions.'"
Rule 3 essentially provides that motor common and contract
carriers and water common and contract carriers and freight forwarders-
may utilize trailer-on-flatcar service under open-tariff rates in the per-
formance of their authorized service." The rule qualifies this general
provision by stating that motor and water common carriers shall
utilize open-tariff TOFC service only if: (1) their tariff publications
give notice that such service may be utilized at their option, but that
the right is reserved to the user of their services to direct that, in any
given instance, TOFC service not be utilized; (2) their transportation
contracts and schedules make appropriate provision therefor; and (3)
the tariffs and schedules set forth the points between which TOFC
service may be performed and the names of the rail carriers whose
TOFC service may be utilized!'
Underlying all the rules, but implicit in rules 2 and 3, is the "basic
premise that all persons desiring to use TOFC service should be able to
do so, with the charges for the same services being equal to all users,
whether they be motor or water carriers, freight forwarders, or private
shippers!' For this reason, the issue was raised during the rulemaking
proceeding as to "whether, and under what circumstances or require-
ments, TOFC service provided under an 'open tariff' can and should be
made available to everyone (including freight forwarders, express
companies, and common and contract motor and water carriers, ex-
empt or regulated)."
The major concern of the railroads, 2 ' as expressed by the Com-
15 322 I.C.C. at 330-36.
18 49 CY.R. § 500.2 (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 336-37.
17 49 c.F.R. § 500.3 (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 337.
18 Id.
19 322 I.C.C. at 319,
28 Id. at 328-29.
21 For a general discussion of the arguments advanced by the various parties involved
in the Ex Porte 230 proceeding with respect to rules 2 and 3 see 322 I.C.C. at 327-37.
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mission in Ex Parte 230, was that should motor carriers be given the
opportunity to utilize TOFC service at the open-tariff rates for their
line-haul movements they would be in a position to direct traffic from
all-rail TOFC service. The other carriers argued, however, that whenever
such service is used the immediate result is revenue to the railroad. It
was also the concern of some that the use of open-tariff TOFC service
by motor carriers would be in contravention of the stated national
transportation policy "to provide for fair and impartial regulation of
all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act .. .
so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of
each . . . ."" The western railroads argued, for instance, that motor
carriers would be able to exploit the railroads' acknowledged inherent
advantage as the nation's low-cost line-haul carrier of goods for great
distances, and that this inherent advantage would be submerged, to be
used as a means by which motor carriers could establish their primacy
in surface transportation.
In reply to these contentions, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion pointed out that
all TOFC service is inherently bimodal in that its basic char-
acteristic is the combination of the inherent advantages of rail
and motor transportation: the railroad's ability to provide
efficient line-haul transportation of huge volumes of freight
for great distances at high speed; and the motor carrier's
ability to provide door-to-door, and if necessary job- or farm-
site, pickup and delivery. TOFC could even be said to be
trimodal, because added to the two factors already mentioned
is its ability to combine in a type of container service many
small shipments—a type of service which has become associ-
ated with the business of the freight forwarder."
The rail carriers also protested use of open-tariff TOFC service
by other carriers on the ground that such use had previously and con-
sistently been considered by the Commission to be repugnant to the
Interstate Commerce Act. The Commission had held that a person
could not act as both a carrier and a shipper with respect to the same
service. In Ex Parte 230, the ICC, while not disputing the fact that
statements to this effect had been made, explained that it did not
understand the courts to have taken the inflexible position
that an administrative agency, even if it has followed a con-
sistent line for some time, cannot, when faced with new de-
velopments or an appreciably changed factual picture in the
22 National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940) (inserted before Chapters
I, 8, 12, 13, and 19 of the Interstate Commerce Act).
23 322 I.C.C. at 329-30.
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segment of the national life which it is charged with regulat-
ing, alter its past interpretation in a formal proceeding .. .
where rules having future effect are to be issued."
The Commission went further, however, and attempted to show
that its holding in the Substituted Freight Service case," relied on by
the railroads in support of their contention, was not necessarily con-
trary to its current position. After a discussion of the circumstances
involved in that case and other similar cases, the Commission concluded
that in saying that a person could not be a carrier and shipper as to the
same service, it did not intend to proscribe the kind of substituted
service in which one common carrier service is substituted for another
through the use of an open-tariff rate of the carrier performing the
substituted service. What this language was directed at was the use of
open-tariff service by a carrier not acting in its proper role of carrier,
but acting, instead, as a shipper or forwarder. The Commission sur-
mised that such a situation might occur were a carrier to tender a
shipment to another carrier for transportation to a point it could not
serve, or over a route it could not use, or without providing in its tariffs
for the substitution.
The Commission concluded, then, in adopting rules 2 and 3 that
when TOFC service is offered by a rail carrier to the public
generally, there is nothing to preclude its use by motor or
water common or contract carriers, in lieu of their all-highway
operations in the performance of authorized transportation
between authorized service points, or by for-hire carriers en-
gaged in transportation which is exempt from economic regu-
lation. To the extent that this conclusion differs from that ex-
pressed in any of our previous decisions . . . such decisions
are hereby overruled."
As previously noted, piggyback service has traditionally been
thought of as rail service. The adoption of rules which reflected the
ICC's belief that the service was really bimodal, provoked immediate
litigation in an effort to determine the validity of these rules and their
true impact on the rail and motor carriers.
In rules 2 and 3, the Commission had concluded that motor com-
mon and contract carriers and water common and contract carriers
could utilize trailer-on-flatcar service in performing all or any portion
of their authorized service through the use of open-tariff rates published
by the rail carriers. In 1965, in Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United
24 Id. at 331.
25 232 I.C.C. 683 (1939).
26 322 I.C.C. at 336.
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States,27
 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois set
aside rules 2 and 3.
The district court believed that the affirmative commands of rules
2 and 3 were not warranted by Sections 2 and 3 of the Interstate
Commerce Act. Section 2 prohibits a rail carrier from discriminating
in rates or rebates between persons for which it does "a like and con-
temporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic
under substantially similar circumstances . . . !" 28 Section 3 (1) states
that it shall be unlawful for any rail carrier to cause any undue or un-
reasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, or to
subject any person to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis-
advantage: "Provided, however, That this paragraph shall not be
construed to apply to discrimination, prejudice, or disadvantage to the
traffic of any other carrier of whatever description!" 29 In seeking to
find specific statutory support for the rules, the court narrowly con-
strued sections 2 and 3. Though conceding that these sections are com-
plementary and must be read in pari materia, the court failed to note
that they must also be read in the context of other provisions of the
Act relating to the common carrier obligation. It did not recognize that
rules 2 and 3 do more than "compel the railroads to afford TOFC
service to motor carriers if it is provided for others!'" The rules are
designed to eliminate discrimination in both rates and service. Rule 2
says not only that all may utilize TOFC service, but also that they may
use it at the same charge for substantially the same service. The district
court rejected the contention that section 3 supports the open-tariff
rules, because of the proviso excluding from that section's coverage
"discrimination, prejudice, or disadvantage to the traffic of any other
carrier of whatever description!' In doing so, the court also rejected
the legislative history of this proviso which demonstrates that it was in-
tended to safeguard the rates of other carriers against claims that they
were unduly prejudicial to the traffic of the rail carrier."
The court, concluding that both rules must fail, held that under
the Interstate Commerce Act railroads may exclude motor carriers
from the public which they are required to serve as common carriers
and that a motor carrier is not authorized to use trailer-on-flatcar
service unless the railroad from whom it desires this service con-
sents." The district court referred to the compartmentalization of
transportation by the Interstate Commerce Act, in other words, the fact
27 244 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. III. 1965).
28 49 U.S.C. 2 (1964).
2° 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1964).
3° 244 F. Supp. at 962.
31 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1964).
32 See 79 Cong. Rec. 5656 (1935).
33 244 F. Supp. at 967-70.
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that the various modes of transportation are dealt within in separate
parts, and the court sought to deal with trailer-on-flatcar service in
terms of these rigid modal divisions. Additionally, it treated trailer-on-
flatcar service, not as intermodal, but as a rail service, which ICC
Rules 2 and 3 would require the railroads to offer to motor carriers.
The district court's view is demonstrated in its reference to an "under-
lying statutory scheme that limits the carrier in each mode to trans-
portation within and by that mode, absent special exception.'
The court's view of trailer-on-flatcar service as essentially a rail
service precipitated its conclusion that the open-tariff rules conflict
with the permissive aspects of Section 216(c) of the Act which states
that " [c] ommon carriers of property by motor vehicle may establish
reasonable through routes and joint rates, charges, and classifications
with other such carriers or with common carriers by railroad and/or
express and/or water . . . . "35 (Emphasis added.) Therefore, it found
that motor carrier use of TOFC service would be tantamount to ship-
ment by other modes which is authorized only under section 216(c) and
only on a voluntary basis. This finding was also based upon the assump-
tion that the offering by a motor carrier of trailer-on-flatcar service,
utilizing in part a rail movement under open-tariff rates, results in
compulsory de facto through routes."
Trailer-on-flatcar service, being essentially bimodal, is neither an
exclusive rail service nor an exclusive motor service, and it cannot be
shaped to fit the measure of any one part of the Interstate Commerce
Act. In TOFC service, the clear distinction between the inherent ad-
vantages of the various modes of transportation has been eliminated
and a combination rail-motor service has sprung up. This coordination
of motor and railroad, and the combination of their individual advan-
tages is an established fact. The advantages of this bimodal service are
today being exploited by the rail carriers, not just to service traffic
traditionally transported by rail, but to capture "a substantial volume
of traffic that previously had been moving by other modes of transporta-
tion, private and for-hire.""
The assumption of the district court, that application of rules 2
and 3 will result in compulsory de facto through routes, is not war-
ranted. On the contrary, the motor carrier, in tendering a shipment
under a rail open-tariff, does not participate with the railroad in offering
a through-transportation service. The services held out by the railroad
and the bill of lading contract between it and the motor carrier en-
compass only the portion of the movement under the open-tariff pro-
34 Id. at 965.
85 49 U.S.C. § 3I6(c) (1964).
36 244 F. Supp. at 965.
37 322 I.C.C. at 307.
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vision. The railroad has no contract with, and is subject to no con-
tractual or statutory liability to, the original shipper. In sum, what is
involved is the unilateral substitution by the motor carrier of a TOFC
movement for a portion of the highway movement. The shipper's bill
of lading contract is only with the motor carrier and the service is that
of the motor carrier. As noted in Thompson v. United States," the
existence of a through route depends on whether or not the participating
carriers hold themselves out as offering through transportation ser-
vice."
The critical issue that needed to be determined was whether a
common carrier might be compelled to hold out its service to the
public on equal terms or whether it might select only that segment of
the public which it chose to serve. An open tariff, by definition, holds
out service to the public without qualification except that users must
meet the lawful tariff requirements. The Commission has construed the
Interstate Commerce Act to forbid railroad discrimination against
motor carriers in the services afforded and to impose upon the railroads
a duty to serve motor carriers equally with private shippers." The
district court's conclusion regarding rules 2 and 3 apparently resulted
from a segmented consideration of the Commission's report and failed
to give proper weight to this duty of the rail carrier. This failure
seemingly resulted from the court's attempt to find explicit support
for these rules in a single section of the Act.
In /CC v. Delaware, L. & W involving the claimed right of
a common carrier to discriminate in its holding out to the public, the
Supreme Court noted the common carrier duty to serve.
The contention that a carrier when goods are tendered to
him for transportation can make the mere ownership of the
goods the test of the duty to carry, or, what is equivalent,
may discriminate in fixing the charge for carriage, not upon
any difference inhering in the goods or in the cost of the
service rendered in transporting them, but upon the mere
circumstance that the shipper is or is not the real owner of the
goods is so in conflict with the obvious and elementary duty
resting upon a carrier, and so destructive of the rights of ship-
pers as to demonstrate the unsoundness of the proposition by
its mere statement. . . . [N]othing in the duties of a common
carrier by the remotest implication can be held to imply the
power to sit in judgment on the title of the prospective shipper
who has tendered goods for transportation. 42
38 343 U.S. 549 (1952).
39 Id. at 557.
40 Id. at 335.
41 220 U.S. 235 (1911).
42 Id. at 252-53.
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While the Commission, in Ex Parte 230, may not have explicated its
reasoning to the satisfaction of the district court, a more liberal judicial
review could have discovered the broadly based duty of the common
carriers by rail. The district court seemed also to impliedly question
the Commission's authority to adopt such rules, yet the ICC in its
report had referred to these rules as those needed "to implement the
broad provisions of existing legislation," 43 and had specifically relied
on its broad rulemaking power." Section 12 of the Interstate Commerce
Act states that the Commission is "authorized and required to execute
and enforce" the provisions of Part I of the Act.'
The district court also concluded that the open-tariff rules were in
conflict with the provisions of Part IV of the Interstate Commerce Act,
which sets forth provisions for the regulation of freight forwarders."
The court's reasoning is premised upon the assumption that a motor
carrier utilizing TOFC service is not operating as a motor carrier. This
reasoning results from the fact that in a TOFC service situation the
motor carrier may be doing little more than picking up and delivering
the freight. However, assembly and delivery of small-lot shipments are
not unique attributes of freight forwarders. As long as a motor carrier
is performing such assembly and delivery as a "motor carrier," he is
excluded from the definition of "freight forwarder" as found in Section
402(a) (5) of the Act."
The district court's final ground for rejecting the open-tariff rules
is based on the long line of past Commission decisions, e.g., Substituted
Freight Service," wherein the Commission declared it to be repugnant
to the Interstate Commerce Act for any person to act as a carrier and a
shipper as to the same service." The Commission's contention regard-
ing the invalidity of this objection has already been discussed. The
effect of a holding such as that of the district court would be either to
force administrative agencies into an undesirable rigidity or to cause
them to restrain from setting standards or taking any firm positions.
The Commission admits that were it summarily to reject its past hold-
ings and attempt somehow to penalize some individual for engaging in
a course of conduct in line with the past holdings, it would be subject
45 322 I.C.C. at 324.
44 "Under parts II, III, and IV of the act, we are given a general rulemaking power
by sections 204(a) (6), 304(a), and 403(a), respectively . . . ." Id. The sections referred
to are: 49 U.S.C. §§ 304(a) (6), 904(a), 1003(a) (1964).
45 49 U.S.C. § 12(1) (1964).
46 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-22 (1964), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1006, 1017 (Supp. II
1965-66). These provisions forbid any person to act as a freight forwarder without a
permit issued by the Commission and prohibit the issuance of such a permit to a common
carrier. Id. at §§ 1010(a) (1), (c).
47 49 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(5) (1964).
48 232 I.C.C. 683 (1939).
40 Id. at 688, 690.
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to an objection. Here, however, no one is being penalized for conduct
based on past holdings, and further, the whole justification for the
establishment of administrative agencies is to permit a development of
the law to meet new circumstances. Congress has cast the regulatory
provisions in general terms and left it to the agencies to spell out the
contents of those terms. The Commission, in Ex Parte 230, was re-
evaluating past decisions in the light of the recent spectacular growth
of trailer-on-flatcar service. Since the earlier decisions were rendered
during the infancy of piggyback service, the re-evaluation was neces-
sary.
In 1967, this controversy reached the Supreme Court in American
Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry." The issue presented was
the validity of rules 2 and 3, and, specifically, whether the Interstate
Commerce Commission has the authority to promulgate rules providing:
(I) that railroads which offer TOFC service to the public under open-
tariff publications must make such service available on the same terms
to motor and water common and contract carriers; and (2) that motor
and water carriers may, subject to certain conditions, utilize TOFC
facilities in the performance of their authorized service.'
The Supreme Court, in considering rule 2, noted that the Inter-
state Commerce Act codified the common law obligations of railroads
as common carriers. 52
 Speaking with reference to Sections 1(4), 2 and
3(1) of the Act,' the Court stated:
The Act does not contain any provision expressly exempting
traffic offered by carriers by motor vehicle from these broad
common-carrier obligations of the railroads. On the contrary,
these sections of the Act, read in light of the historic obliga-
tions and duties of common carriers and the large number of
decisions of the Commission, and of the courts in this country
and in England, indicate, presumptively at least, that rail-
roads may not offer the service of transporting trailers for
other shippers and deny that service to motor carriers."
The Court felt that the Commission's rule 2 was practically a para-
phrase of Section 2 of the Act, and further believed that it was of no
consequence that the Act did not expressly command that the railroads
furnish this service to motor carriers. The Court stated that the rail-
50 387 U.S. 397 (1967).
51 Id. at 400.
52 Id. at 406.
53 Section 1(4) provides in part: "It shall be the duty of every common carrier
subject to this chapter to provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable request
therefor, and to establish reasonable through routes with other such carriers. . . ." 49
U.S.C. § 1(4) (1964). For provisions of sections 2 and 3(1) see text accompanying notes
28 and 29 supra.
54 387 U.S. at 407.
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roads' obligation is "comprehensive and exceptions are not to be
implied. The fact that the person tendering traffic is a competitor does
not permit the railroad to discriminate against him or in his favor!"u 5
The Supreme Court was previously faced with a similar intermodal
problem in the case of United States v. Pennsylvania R.R." There, the
Court rejected the contention that the Transportation Act of 1940,
which established Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act, 57 providing
for the regulation of water carriers, did not in specific language autho-
rize the Commission to require rail carriers to interchange their freight
cars with competing water carriers. The Court also emphatically re-
jected the very basis upon which the district court in the Santa Fe
case was later to premise its decision, namely, that since the Act reg-
ulates rail, motor, and water carriers separately, the Commission may
not compel the mutual furnishing of services and facilities. The Court,
considering the National Transportation Policy, held that the Inter-
state Commerce Act is designed " 'to provide a completely integrated
interstate regulatory system over motor, railroad, and water car-
riers . . . and that the Commission, therefore, has powers com-
mensurate with that goal. It then , concluded:
In view of this, we cannot accept arguments based upon
arguable inference from nonspecific statutory language, limit-
ing the Commission's power to adopt rules which, essentially,
reflect its judgment in light of current facts as to the proper
interrelationship of several modes of transportation with re-
spect to an important new development."
The Court found to be without merit the contention that there is
an implied congressional purpose in Section 216(c) of the Act, which
authorizes railroads to enter into voluntary arrangements for through
routes and joint rates, to prohibit the Commission from compelling
railroads to furnish services to motor carriers.'
The district court's holding that Section 3 (1) of the Interstate
Commerce Act allows the railroads to discriminate against the motor
carriers was also rejected. The Court pointed out that:
This is language more notable for its awkwardness than for its
clarity; but it certainly was not intended . . . to grant license
to discriminate against traffic offered to the railroad by
another carrier. We have noted above that this Court has
55 Id.
56 323 U.S. 612 (1945).
57 49 U.S.C. H 901-23 (1964), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 912 (Stipp. II 1965-66).
58 387 U.S. at 409. The Court quoted from its holding in United States v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 323 U.S. at 618-19.
56 387 U.S. at 410.
66 Id. at 410-11.
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clearly held that such discrimination is not permissible. More-
over, there is an intelligible meaning which can be ascribed to
the proviso and which is consistent with its history. The pro-
viso means that the prohibition against "undue or unreason-
able preference or advantage" is not to be construed to forbid
practices, otherwise lawful, solely because they operate to the
prejudice of another carrier."
In light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court had only to consider the
provisions of the Act which require the railroad to perform as common
carriers and concluded that the Commission had the requisite authority
to promulgate rule 2.
Having discussed the duty of the railroads to perform as common
carriers, the Court directed its attention to the validity of rule 3. The
railroads had contended that, notwithstanding their duty as common
carriers, motor carriers may not be authorized to substitute transporta-
tion by rail for the transportation by road which is the basis of their
franchise, except with the agreement of the railroad. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, stating:
It is this [contention] ... that saps the [railroads'] argument
of some of its force, if not its fervor. One would assume that
if the motor carriers are not authorized by their franchise
under the Act to substitute transportation by rail for transpor-
tation by road, they could not do so with the consent of the
railroads."
The Court noted that the Interstate Commerce Act defines a "common
carrier by motor vehicle" as "any person which holds itself out to the
general public to engage in the transportation by motor vehicle in
interstate or foreign commerce of passengers or property . . . for com-
pensation . . . except transportation ... by an express company to the
extent that such transportation has heretofore been subject to chapter
1 of this [Act]."" The Court further noted that this definition does not
exclude voluntary joint arrangements with other carriers, rail or water.
Further, these are expressly permitted by Section 216(c) of the Act,"
so the Court concluded "that the Act cannot be construed to require
that the trucker must always transport its cargo exclusively by road!'"
Reiterating generally the provisions of Part IV of the Interstate
Commerce Act regulating freight forwarders," the Court next ad-
61 Id. at 411.
62 Id. at 413.
63 49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(14) 0960.
61 49 U.S.C. § 316(c) (1964).
65 387 U.S. at 415.
66 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-22 (1964), as amended, 49 U.S.0 §§ 1006, 1017 (Supp. II
1965-66). Herein a freight forwarder is defined as
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dressed itself to the argument advanced by the freight forwarders.
They had contended that the Act authorizes only freight forwarders to
engage in the assembly and consolidation of shipments and the subse-
quent use of rail facilities for transportation and that permitting the
motor carriers to engage in this sort of service, by means of TOFC on
open-tariff, was to authorize them to engage in this service in violation
of the Act's prohibition against licensing other carriers as freight for-
warders. The Supreme Court noted, however, that "truckers have also
traditionally assembled, consolidated, and distributed cargo in connec-
tion with providing their authorized transportation services."' Section
402(a) (5) of the Act specifically exempts from the freight-forwarder
provisions any person who performs these services as a carrier subject
to another part of the Act." The Commission's rules 2 and 3 merely
make the utilization of TOFC service available to the motor carrier
where offered generally and, as a practical matter, permit the motor
carrier to assemble, consolidate, transport by piggyback, and distribute
without the prior concurrence of the railroad. The Court, therefore, held
that: "The fact that the Commission enlarges this additional possibility
of transportation of the truckers' trailers may be a competitive fact of
some significance, but it does not convert the truckers into freight for-
warders, nor deprive the latter of the exclusive rights specified in the
Act.""
In reply to the argument that the Commission's prior construction
and application of the Act precluded its present position, the Court
liberally construed the role of regulatory agencies, stating:
[W]e agree that the Commission, faced with new develop-
ments or in light of reconsideration of the relevant facts and
its mandate, may alter its past interpretation and overturn past
administrative rulings and practice. .. . In fact ... this kind
of flexibility and adaptability to changing needs and patterns
of transportation is an essential part of the office of a regula-
tory agency."
In conclusion, the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he controlling
fact of the matter is that all piggyback service is, by its essential
any person which (otherwise than as a carrier [by rail, motor vehicle, or
water] ...) holds itself out to the general public as a common carrier to trans-
port or provide transportation of property . . . and which . . . (A) assembles
and consolidates . . . shipments . . . and (B) assumes responsibility for the
transportation of such property from point of receipt to point of destination, and
(C) utilizes, for the whole or any part of the transportation of such shipments,
the services of a [rail, motor, or water] carrier subject to ... this title.
Id. at § 1002 (a) (5).
67 387 U.S. at 419.
68 49 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(5) (1964).
69 387 U.S. at 420.
to Id. at 416.
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nature, bimodal."ll The Court further stated that in the absence of
congressional direction, there is no basis for denying the ICC the power
to regulate transportation which involves both elements. 72
There can be little doubt that trailer-on-flatcar service has vir-
tually erased the historic lines of demarcation between modes of trans-
portation, and permits the blending of attributes of both rail and motor
service in providing for a transportation system responsive to the needs
of the nation. Through exploitation of TOFC service the railroads have
been able to avoid the limitations inherent in conventional railroad
operations and offer the shippers a service which is predicated upon the
door-to-door movement of freight in the same highway vehicle, thus
taking advantage of the attributes of motor carriers. As a result, the
transportation services of railroads are no longer confined to the steel
rail but extend over the streets and highways to the doors of shippers
.and consignees. Pursuant to the prior decisions of the Commission, the
railroads have been able to bar motor carrier use of this bimodal
service and have been able to invade, to a substantial degree, the
traffic traditionally transported by motor carriers. The Commission in
their rulemaking proceeding, sought to give the motor carriers a quid
pro quo for allowing the railroads to exploit the former's inherent ad-
vantages and, further, to eliminate the arbitrary bar to the use of TOFC
service exercised at the discretion of the railroads. In doing so, the
Commission complied with the mandate of the National Transportation
Policy which calls for the "fair and impartial regulation of all modes of
transportation subject to the Act!'"
III. RULES CONCERNING AND LIMITING MOTOR-RAIL
COORDINATED SERVICE
A. Rule 4—Joint Intermodal Service
Historically, limits have been placed upon motor-rail coordination
and it was necessary for the Commission to assess the effect of these
limits in light of its expanded open-tariff conclusions. Rule 4, a by-
product of rules 1, 2, and 3, was the result of this assessment and
essentially rephrased the legal limits that had been placed on motor-
rail coordination.
This joint intermodal service rule finds its source in a long line of
Commission decisions and essentially embraces the general rule that
a regulated carrier cannot enter into joint rates with an unregulated
carrier. Rule 4 provides in part:
71 Id. at 420.
72 Id. at 421.
73 National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940) (inserted before Chapters
I, 8, 12, 13, and 19 of the Interstate Commerce Act).
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(a) Except as otherwise may be prohibited by these
rules, any rail carrier or carriers subject to part I of the act
may enter into through-route and joint-rate arrangements
with any motor common carrier subject to part II of the act or
any water common carrier subject to part III of the act,
wherein TOFC service is to be provided either in lieu of, or
in addition to, the authorized all-highway or all-water service
of such motor or water common carrier.
(b) Motor or water common carriers may participate in
joint intermodal TOFC service in lieu of their authorized all-
highway or all-water service only if their tariff publications
give notice that such service may be provided at their option,
but that the right is reserved to the user of their services to
direct that in any particular instance such TOFC service not
be provided.
(c) Tariffs embracing joint intermodal TOFC rates or
charges, including Substituted Service Directories, if used,
shall set forth the service covered by the published rates or
charges; the points of interchange between modes of trans-
portation; and the names of the carriers participating there-
in."
The notion that regulated and unregulated carriers cannot enter
together into joint rates developed over a long period, and rules 4(a),
(b), and (c) expressed the results of previous rulings and cases.
These rules follow directly from rule 1 and, with the Supreme Court
upholding the validity of rules 2 and 3, emerge as very important
concepts. A historical analysis of the developments of these concepts is
necessary in order to appreciate its present impact on piggyback
service.
1. Developments Prior to the Motor Carrier Act of 1935." In the
1897 case of Cary v. Eureka Springs Ry.," the defendant railroad
sought to enter into a joint rate with a stage line. The ICC ruled that
such an arrangement was illegal in a situation where the transporta-
tion would be beyond the end of the rail line.
The arrangement between [the railroad] ... and the Harrison
Transportation Company was an attempt to extend their line
beyond Eureka Springs ... and other points in Arkansas not
reached by the line or road of the defendants or either of
them....
74 49 C.F.R. § 500.4 (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 351-52.
75 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1964), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304-05, 308, 312, 314,
322 (Sapp. II 1965-66).
75 7 I.C.C. 286 (1897).
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The provisions of [the Interstate Commerce Act] ... do
not apply to transportation by team or wagon and neither the
joint tariffs, nor the arrangement of defendants with the Har-
rison Transportation Company, made them joint carriers with
said Transportation Company, nor carriers at all beyond Eu-
reka Springs."
Eight years later, in Wylie v. Northern Pac. Ry., 78 an arrangement
similar to that in the Eureka Springs case (also involving a stagecoach
line) was again declared unlawful. The Commission held that the de-
fendant railroad was without authority to make traffic agreements either
with the transportation company which provided stages for touring
Yellowstone Park, or with the association which conducted the hotels
there. 7° The ICC believed that the parties were not competent in law
to form through routes and to establish joint rates as provided for in
Section 6, now Section 6(7), of the Interstate Commerce Act. 8° Fur-
ther, the tariff under which the rates and tickets in question were pro-
vided could not be regarded as a joint tariff established by connecting
carriers under the authority of the Act.' Section 6(7) provides:
No carrier, unless otherwise provided by this chapter,
shall engage or participate in the transportation of passengers
or property . . . unless the rates, fares, and charges upon
which the same are transported . . . have been filed and pub-
lished in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; nor
shall any carrier charge or demand . . . a greater or less or
different compensation for such transportation ... or for any
service in connection therewith, between the points named
in such tariffs than the rates, fares, and charges which are
specified in the tariff filed ... nor shall any carrier refund or
remit ... any portion of the rates, fares, and charges so speci-
fied, nor extend to any shipper or person any privileges or
facilities in the transportation of passengers or property, ex-
cept such as are specified in such tariffs."
In Eureka Springs and Wylie, the Commission had been concerned
with the capacity of a given carrier to form through routes and enter
into joint rates, this capacity being dependent upon the jurisdiction of
the Commission over those carriers. Since Section 6 of the Act dealt
with rates of carriers regulated by the Act, any joint rates set up
between a regulated mode of transportation and an unregulated mode
77 Id. at 310-11.
78 11 I.C.C. 145 (1905).
79 Id. at 154.
80 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1964).
81 II I.C.C. at 154.
8.2
	 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1964).
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were invalid for the compelling reasons of lack of jurisdiction and,
hence, inability to conform to the provisions of section 6. This was
clearly expressed in 1908 when the Commission decided the case of
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. Hamburg-American Packet Co." This
case involved the lawfulness of joint rail-water rates where the water
carrier employed ocean-going vessels. The Commission condemned such
such joint rates stating:
The Commission, not having been given control over the
ocean carriers, can not compel observance of the law by such
carriers, and if they so choose they may alter their rates at
such times as they please or for such patrons as they please.
Therefore the line must be drawn decisively between those
carriers whose rates and practices this Commission can control
and those which it can not control; and upon this line of
reasoning it has been the consistent ruling of the Commission
that "joint rates" can not be made between carriers subject
to the act and those not subject to the act. Wylie v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. 11 I.C.C. Rep. 145; Cary v. Eureka Springs Ry.
Co. 7 I.C.C. Rep. 286.
The "joint rate" referred to in section 6 is a "joint rate"
made between two or more carriers all of whom are of the
classes designated within section 1 as being subject to control
and regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission."
The Commission went further, however, indicating that the above
holding was not founded upon an assumption that the Interstate Com-
merce Act takes from the regulated common carrier any common law
right to contract freely with other carriers even though they may not
be subject to the Act. According to the Commission's opinion, a rail
carrier could control, or connect with, a line of steamships engaged in
foreign commerce; could interchange business as freely with such a
steamship company as with another rail carrier; could quote a com-
bined rate for the through movement; "[Nut as to such carriers en-
gaged in foreign business, the rail carrier has, so far as this law is con-
cerned, a purely contractual or proprietary relation, not a relation
regulated or controlled in any manner by [the Interstate Commerce
Act] . . . ."" This same principle was reflected in the Commission's
Conference Ruling 441 of 1913. There the Commission considered
drayage, or the carting of goods, in connection with joint tariffs. At
that time, drayage was primarily accomplished by wagon train. As a
result of its consideration, the ICC held that a drayage firm was not a
83 13 I.C.C. 266 (1908).
84 Id. at 280.
85 Id. at 280-81.
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proper party to a joint tariff nor was it a carrier under the provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Act and, therefore, no tariffs could properly
be filed by it. Additionally, the Commission held that:
(a) Where there is an additional transfer or drayage
charge in connection with a through shipment, the carriers'
tariffs must specify what that charge shall be.
(b) If such drayage or transfer charge is absorbed, in
whole or in part, by a carrier, the tariffs must show the amount
of such transfer charge that will be absorbed.
Summarizing these cases, it appears that the distinction between
that which was allowed by the Commission and that which was not was,
respectively, a tariff by the regulated carrier which indicated any
additional charge made in respect of a through route limited to the
regulated carrier's authorized route, and a joint tariff whereby the
nonregulated carrier might hold out the service and the through route
might be extended by the nonregulated carrier.
The holdings in Conference Ruling 441 and the Hamburg Packet
case formed the basis for an investigation into cartage, this time in-
volving primarily motor carriers. The report of the Commission, en-
titled Tariffs Embracing Motor-Truck or Wagon Transfer Service,
appeared in 1924.86
 As indicated by the Commission in the introduction
to its report, this investigation concerned the legality of schedules con-
tained in the tariffs
wherein motor-truck or wagon transfers are employed to per-
form any portion of the transportation service either within
or between defined terminal districts, between defined term-
inal districts and interior points, or between interior points,
in connection with carriers by rail, water, or rail-and-water
routes, subject to the interstate commerce act.'
The use of truck or wagon transfers by the carriers generally fell into
one of three categories: (1) use in connection with terminal services
within terminal districts; (2) use in connection with transfer in
transit between rail carriers at an intermediate point; and (3) use in
connection with hauls extending beyond terminal districts, commonly
designated as line-hauls.
The character of this third category was demonstrated by the
Starin-New Haven situation. The Starin-New Haven Line was a water
carrier operating between New Haven and New York where it con-
nected with the Clyde Steamship Company and the Mallory Steamship
Company, also water lines. The Clyde lines published joint water-and-
86 91 I.C.C. 539 (1924) (hereinafter cited as Tariffs Embracing Transfer Service).
87 Td. at 540.
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rail rate tariffs from New Haven and New York to interior points in
southern territory in connection with southern rail carriers serving
southern Atlantic and Gulf ports. These tariffs were concurred in by the
Starin-New Haven Line and the southern rail carriers. The Starin-New
Haven was in competition with the New York, New Haven and Hart-
ford Railroad, which had established routes from interior New England
points and had refused to join with the Starin-New Haven Line in the
publication of joint rates from these interior points. The water carrier,
therefore, was essentially forced into making agreements with two
private trucking concerns to operate a trucking service from four in-
terior points to New Haven. The truck companies were not shown in
the tariffs as originating or participating carriers and the amounts paid
them were likewise not shown.
In discussing the legality of the tariffs involved in this situation,
the Commission referred to Section 1(1) of the Interstate Commerce
Act, which' states that: "The provisions of this chapter shall apply to
common carriers engaged in—(a) The transportation of passengers or
property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water
when both are used under a common control, management, or arrange-
ment for a continuous carriage or shipment . . . ."" The Commission
then concluded that the local service of the Starin-New Haven Line
between New Haven and New York was not subject to its jurisdiction
but that the joint rates of the water carrier and the Clyde lines and
southern rail carriers were under its jurisdiction." The question then
became whether or not the service in connection with such joint rates
could be lawfully extended to the New England interior points in the
manner attempted. The ICC concluded that it could not.
The hauls by motor truck from the four inland points to
the Starin-New Haven docks at New Haven cannot be said to
be transportation over which we have jurisdiction or a service
that can be required of a common carrier. The trucking com-
pany cannot, under those conditions, be acting as an agent for
a common carrier. As stated, a trucking company is not a
carrier subject to the provisions of the act. Consequently the
trucking company is not a proper party to a joint tariff. Conf. .
Ruling 441."
The Commission went on to point out:
While there is no express prohibition in the act against
the publication of joint rates in connection with a common
carrier not subject to the act, we have consistently held that
88 49 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1964).
89 91 I.C.C. at 548.
00 Id.
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the line must be drawn between those carriers whose rates
and practices we can control and those which we cannot con-
trol; and upon this line of reasoning it has been our ruling that
joint rates cannot be made between carriers subject to the act
and those not subject to the act. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co.
v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 13 I.C.C. 266. The law,
however, does not prohibit either a rail or water carrier sub-
ject to the act from interchanging business with motor trucks
and entering into proper arrangements to acquaint the ship-
ping public with the total charges for the full movement. But
such arrangements are not required by law and the fact that
they may be entered into does not extend the terms of the act
to include the motor-truck service. Section 6 requires that the
charges for the service subject to the act be filed with us,
which requirement we have always construed as making
necessary the statement in the tariffs of such charges
separately from other charges not subject to the act.'
It should be noted that the Commission apparently places reliance on
the form of section 6 rather than on the substantive concept of exten-
sion of a regulated carrier's service which was relied on in the Eureka
Springs case.
In Tariffs Embracing Transfer Service, the Commission also gave
examples of the other two types of service performed by motor trucks
for regulated carriers, namely, that used in connection with terminal
services within terminal districts, and that used in connection with
transfer in transit between rail carriers at an intermediate point. Of
particular significance is the former service which was discussed in
regard to the St. Louis Terminal Case' In brief, the situation was that
some carriers operating under joint rates had terminal facilities located
both in St. Louis, Missouri and in East St. Louis, Illinois, separated
only by the Mississippi River. An arrangement was made with certain
trucking companies to transport the freight across the river between
terminals. The trucking companies would issue bills of lading and col-
lect freight charges as agents for the carriers. In that case, the Com-
mission found the performance of this delivery service to be lawful."
The Commission probably relied, although it is not clearly apparent,
on Section 1(3) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act." This section,
after defining the term common carrier as including public service
91 Id. at 548-49.
92 34 I.C.C. 453 (1915). The use of trucks in connection with transfers in transit is
discussed in Tariffs Embracing Transfer Service, 91 I.C.C. at 543-44.
93 34 I.C.C. at 462.
44 49 U.S.C. § 1(3)(a) (1964).
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companies of various species, among which motor-truck or wagon
transfer companies are not mentioned, states:
The term "railroad" . . . shall include all bridges, car
floats ... used by or operated in connection with any railroad,
and also all the road in use by any common carrier operating
a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agree-
ment, or lease, and also all ... tracks, terminals, and termi-
nal facilities of every kind used or necessary in the transpor-
tation of the persons or property designated herein . . . The
term "transportation" ... shall include locomotives, cars, and
other vehicles, vessels, and all instrumentalities and facilities
of shipment or carriage, irrespective of ownership or of any
contract . . . and all services in connection with the receipt,
delivery, elevation, and transfer in transit.'
It is evident, therefore, that joint rail-motor rates involving purely
terminal cartage were allowed though motor carriers were still not
subject to regulation.
In Trucking Less-Than-Carload Freight in Lieu of Rail Service in
Chicago District, decided in 1932, 96 the Commission stated:
We have held that motor-truck or wagon-transfer com-
panies are not carriers subject to the act, that line-haul service
performed by them is not transportation subject to the act,
but that motor-truck or wagon-transfer service performed in
connection with terminal services by a rail carrier is subject
to our jurisdiction. Twills Embracing Motor-Truck or Wagon
Transfer Service, 91 I.C.C. 539. When a motor-truck service
between freight houses within the same terminal district is
performed in interstate commerce by a carrier subject to
our jurisdiction, the extent of the service and the rates there-
for must be published in tariffs filed with us."
It seems certain, therefore, that the Commission construed Section
1(3) of the Act as including terminal services by motor carrier within
"railroad transportation." The Trucking L.C.L. case was a forerunner
of what, today, is called substituted service.
2. Developments Subsequent to the Motor Carrier Act. Subse-
quent to the introduction of ICC regulation of motor carriers under
Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Hamburg-Packet rule that
95 Id. While the Commission cited this section and quoted the definitions after its
discussion of the St. Louis Terminal Case and during its discussion of the Starin-New
Haven situation, it seems reasonable that it had this section of the Interstate Commerce
Act in mind at the time it rendered its decision in the former case
66 185 I.C.C. 71 (1932).
67 Id. at 72-73.
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joint rates cannot be entered into by regulated and unregulated carriers
has been the law for motor-rail joint rates.
In piggyback service there are two plans which are joint-rate
arrangements, namely, plans I and V. In Ex Parte 230, under the topic
Joint Intermodal Service, the Commission devoted most of its time to
equating plan I with plan V. TOFC plan I, which is known as "sub-
stituted service," evolved from a famous decision entitled Substituted
Freight Service." There the Commission said that
either the rail carrier must have authority to engage in com-
mon carriage by motor vehicle in its own right, or the motor
carriers joining in such service must be authorized to act as
such carriers in their individual capacities. In either event,
where the substitution service consists of a combination of
line-haul movements by rail and motor, it is in legal effect a
joint service, no matter by what other name it may be desig-
nated." (Footnote omitted.)
In the 1954 case of Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail,'" which
formed the basis for several points in TOFC service, the Commission
hedged on the problem of regulated-unregulated joint rates, but did
conclude that trailer-on-flatcar service was a rail move. The major
question in that case, however, was whether: "As between a railroad
and a motor common carrier whose loaded and empty trailers are
moving in the railroad's trailer-on-flatcar service . . . the relation [is]
that of connecting carriers ... where the arrangement is for other than
substituted rail-for-motor service [.]"' 0 ' The Commission's answer was
hardly responsive as it stated:
Although the railroads are under no obligation to police the
operations of motor carriers with respect to their certificates,
we believe that, when they enter into joint-rate arrangements
with such carriers, they should satisfy themselves that the
motor carriers have authority to operate with respect to the
commodities concerned between the points where the sub-
stituted service is performed."'
By failing to answer the specific question posed, the Commission
missed an opportunity to solve some fundamental issues.
In Ex Parte 230, the Commission held that substituted service
(plan I only) involved joint rates as did plan V and that both of these
fundamental types of coordinated piggyback service were lawful
08 232 I.C.C. 683 (1939).
nu Id. at 687-88.
in 293 I.C.C. 93 (1954).
1 " Id. at 105.
102 Id. at 107.
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through-route arrangements. 103 The Commission described plan I as
providing
for the "substitution" of rail for motor service at rates which
are the equivalent of corresponding all-highway rates pub-
lished by the participating motor carrier. A motor Substituted
Freight Service Directory provides reference to the concur-
rence of the rail carrier and the points between which the
substitution may be made, and such information is incor-
porated into the governing rate tariff by an appropriate tariff
rule which preserves the shipper's right to direct that such
substitution not take place?"
With respect to plan V, the Commission pointed out that
rail-motor, motor-rail, or motor-rail-motor services are pro-
vided under joint rates which are generally published in a
tariff separate and distinct from other tariffs maintained by
the participating regulated common carriers and which are
applicable only over the through route or routes. There is no
question but that a motor common carrier may, under an
appropriate plan V tariff, interchange traffic with the partici-
pating railroad at an authorized service point short of the full
length of its authorized operations, and later receive such
traffic back again for movement between other of its author-
ized points of service. In such an operation, of course, the
rail carrier's physical participation in the through movement
is as a "bridge" carrier and is substantially similar to that
present in a plan I operation.'
The net result of the plan I and plan V conclusions was to allow only
motor common carriers subject to Part II of the Act to participate in
plan I service arrangements and to preclude such participation by
contract carriers as well as by unregulated carriers generally."' This
result is, in turn, the basis of rules 4(a), (b), and (c).
103 322 I.C.C. at 342. It is not clear why all TOFC, as opposed to only that involved
in plan I, should not be included.
104 Id .
105 Id. The Commission stated:
The fundamental distinction between plan I and plan V operations, as we see
it, is that rail and motor carriers serving different areas may combine their
service in plan V operations to perform a through service between origin and
destination. Another difference is that the tariff rules covering the rendition of
plan I service specifically embrace a holding out by the motor carrier to perform
an all-highway service at the election of the shipper, whereas the rates provided
in plan V joint tariffs are applicable only over the joint intermodal route. In
substance, then, plan I merely embraces a simplified form of tariff publica-
Id. at 349.
106 Id. at 350.
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Rule 4(d), which does not part with established practice, requires
that "[c]arriers participating in joint intermodal TOFC service shall
interchange traffic only at a common point of service."' Rule 4(e)
involves the issue of whether substituted service could embrace the
entire line-hau1. 1" The basic problem seemed to center on the fact that
if substitution were made the motor carrier would be performing only
terminal functions. This, in turn, would make such a motor carrier
appear to be engaged, not in line-haul functions, but in freight-forward-
ing functions. The two functions are regulated under Parts II and IV
of the Act, respectively, and freight forwarding operations are, by ex-
press declaration in Section 202(c) (2) of the Act, not subject to Part
II under which motor carriers are authorized to enter into joint rates. 10 '
Substitution for the entire line-haul was, however, allowed by the ICC.
The Commission reasoned that whenever joint intermodal TOFC ser-
vice was to be provided in lieu of an authorized all-motor operation, it
was the motor carrier, and not the line-haul railroad, which was the
primary carrier and which gave the terminal operations color under the
law."' In other words, it seemed clear that in such circumstances the
collection and delivery services performed by a motor carrier within
terminal areas were part and parcel of that motor carrier's authorized
line-haul highway service and were to be regarded and regulated as
such.
Another Commission rule concerns the commodities with re-
spect to which tariffs may be published. Rule 4(f) states: "Tariffs
setting forth through rates or charges for joint intermodal TOFC
transportation may be published only with respect to commodities the
transportation of which is subject to economic regulation throughout
the entire movement provided for in such tariffs.' This rule rests on
the broad conclusion, drawn by the Commission in Ex Parte 230, that
should a motor carrier file with the Commission a tariff which
by its terms might appear to cover exempt transportation (for
example, a rate on "foodstuffs," a generic description which
107 49 C.F.R. § 500.4(d) (1967). This rule also relates to rule 3(e) which provides
that "imlotor and water common and contract carriers utilizing open-tariff TOFC
service in the performance of authorized transportation shall tender traffic to and receive
traffic from rail carriers only at points which the motor and water carriers are authorized
to serve." 49 C.F.R. § 500.3(e) (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 355.
198 49 C.F.R. § 500.4(e) (1967).
Where joint intermodal TOFC service is to be performed in lieu of a motor
or water carrier's authorized all-highway or all-water route, tariffs embracing
rates or charges covering such service may provide for the performance of TOFC
service for the entire line-haul movement.
322 I.C.C. at 361.
109 49 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2) (1964).
110 322 I.C.C. at 360.
111 49 C.F.R. § 500.4(f) (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 354.
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would include many unprocessed agricultural commodities),
it would nevertheless not be bound to charge the published
rate, and the Commission would have no authority to compel
it to do so. The corollary to this proposition, which is equally
true, is that with regard to transportation for which the Com-
mission cannot compel compliance with tariff publications, a
carrier cannot publish with the Commission a tariff which can
be recognized by it in any way. The upshot of the matter is
simply that there is no way in which a motor or water carrier
can publish an effective rate covering transportation not sub-
ject to the Commission's economic regulation. It must follow
that an attempted joint rate covering such transportation is
equally abortive, for where one party to an alleged through
rate is under no obligation to collect the stated charges, the
rate itself can be of no force and effect. 112
B. Circuity Limitations Placed on Motor Carrier Use of TOFC
A problem which had confronted the Commission for a number of
years was presented whenever a motor carrier, authorized to operate
between two given points over a circuitous route, attempted to use, in
lieu of its all-highway service, the TOFC service of a railroad whose
lines provided a more direct routing between the terminals. This issue
had arisen because motor carriers, whether operating over regular
or irregular routes, are ordinarily limited as to the points they can
serve and the manner in which they can operate between them. A
regular-route motor carrier is restricted to operation over certain high-
ways, and as its business expands and its operating authority increases
on a piecemeal basis, it is likely to find itself with authorized routes
between certain points which are not the most direct available. An
irregular-route motor carrier is apt to find itself engaged in circuitous
operations only if it combines two or more grants of authority at com-
mon service points in order to provide through transportation. Should
a motor carrier be able to secure a substantially more direct route
through the use of piggyback service, the purposes of the ICC-imposed
route limits would be negated."'
In line with the fundamental policy established in rules 2, 3, and
4, the Commission resolved this circuitous route problem by directing,
in rule 5, that:
112 322 I.C.C. at 352-53. The Commission's conclusion and the resulting rule 4(f)
derive basically from Section 216(c) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 316(c)
(1964), which, as the Commission states, "contains no provision for the participation in
such rates by carriers not subject to the Commission's economic jurisdiction." 322 I.C.C.
at 354.
113 For a general discussion of circuity limitations, see 322 I.C.C. at 361-64.
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(a) Motor and water common carriers shall not partici-
pate in joint intermodal TOFC service which is to be pro-
vided in lieu of their authorized line-haul transportation, and
motor and water common and contract carriers shall not uti-
lize open tariff TOFC service, where the distance from origin
to destination over the route including the TOFC movement is
less than 85 percent of the distance between such points over
the motor or water carrier's authorized service route: Pro-
vided, however, That the Interstate Commerce Commission
may grant relief from the provisions of this paragraph upon
consideration of an appropriate petition.'"
The railroads sought to have the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, in the Sante Fe case, declare the invalidity of this rule.
While the court felt that the rule was not without rational foundation,
it found that insofar as rule 5 related to open-tariff service, it must
fall with rules 2 and 31 1 u With the Supreme Court upholding the
validity of rules 2 and 3, rule 5 is restored.
C. Placing and Securing Trailers—A Railroad Responsibility
While not strictly a limitation upon intermodal service, rule 6 im-
posed upon the railroads the duty of securing motor-carrier trailers
upon the flatcars. Under these safety measures, however, the railroads
were granted the right to refuse trailers which did not conform to
Commission-prescribed safety regulations."' The railroad was also
required to ramp and deramp the trailer (load and unload the flatcar),
unless a tariff provision was published by the railroad to relieve it of
this responsibility.
D. Billing, Notification, Tariffs and Trailer Leasing—
The Housekeeping Rules
1. Billing and Notification—Rule 8. Before turning to the more
important rule 7, concerning tariff publication and trailer leasing, it is
114 49 C.F.R. § 500.5(a) (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 364.
115 Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 955, 970 (ND. Ill. 1965).
116 (a) Railroads participating in TOFC service shall assume responsibility for
the safe securing of highway trucks, trailers, or semi-trailers (or the demount-
able container portion thereof) on the rail cars when moving over their lines;
and, unless otherwise provided for by tariff, or in the case of connecting common
carriers by agreement, railroads shall also assume responsibility for the safe
placing of highway trucks, trailers, or semi-trailers (or the demountable con-
tainer portion thereof) on rail cars and for removing them from rail cars.
(b) Railroads participating in TOFC service have the right to refuse to
accept for transportation in such service any highway trucks, trailers, or semi-
trailers (or the demountable container portion thereof) which do not conform
to the motor carrier safety regulations prescribed by the Commission.
49 C.F.R. § 500.6 (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 367.
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well to consider some of the questions which arose from, or were allied
with, the unique operational aspects of piggybacking. The railroads did
not want to use this new concept merely to shift existing carload traffic
into a trailer. They therefore constructed the TOFC rates so as to
place a premium upon trailers that were not completely loaded with
one commodity. To do this, they provided incentive rates for a trailer
which contained not more than a specified percentage, usually 60 per-
cent, of one commodity. Thereby the carload commodity traffic would
be less likely to be diverted to piggyback. To enforce the content
mixture rule, the railroads either required certification or asked the
shipper to provide a manifest of the shipment.
Since rates are traditionally based upon the weight of the com-
modity being moved, some system had to be devised to ascertain TOFC
weights. This was especially difficult with respect to plan III operations,
where the railroad service was ramp-to-ramp, and the delivery and
pickup was performed by the shipper or freight forwarder. The rail-
roads realized that because of operational difficulty and a lack of weigh-
ing facilities, they could not require the shipper to weigh the trailer.
To do so would have completely stunted the growth of TOFC service.
Most railroads solved the problem by requiring the shipper to certify
the weight of each individual shipment.
While these two certification policies, mixture of content and
weight, were practical solutions to the problems, it was felt that
standardization was necessary to eliminate the possibility of harm to
shippers through the use of discriminatory practices by different rail-
roads using different rules. To achieve this standardization, the Com-
mission proposed rules which were, theoretically, the most complete
solution to the problem. Weight and content certifications were to be
made by the shipper prior to the time the railroad commenced trans-
porting the shipment. The rules would be clear and there would be no
possibility for discriminatory application. No move would be made until
certification had been received.
While there was no real opposition by the railroads or shippers to
the idea of having rules respecting billing practices, there was much
dissent regarding the requirement that certification or a manifest be
tendered before the shipment moved. One added sore point was the
proposed requirement that a bill of lading be issued prior to transporta-
don of the shipment. The rulemaking proceeding had produced evidence
of delay by rail carriers in issuing bills of lading. The consequence of
such premovement-documentation requirements would have been quite
serious to piggybacking. The speed and flexibility which had been its
hallmark would end as trailers sat loaded for movement but waiting for
the processing of paperwork. The ICC's examiners recognized this prob-
lem and revised the rules to eliminate some of the stringency of prior
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documentation. The bill-of-lading requirement was changed to require
the "prompt" issuance of "either a receipt or a bill of lading" for the
shipment.' This conformed with Section 20(11) of the Interstate
Commerce Act which provides that a railroad shall, upon receipt of
property, issue a receipt or bill of lading.'" It was also in accord with
the manner in which carload shipments had traditionally been handled.
To further ease the premovement-documentation requirements,
the examiners provided that where a manifest was used by the shipper,
it could be presented to the originating carrier not later than 24 hours
after the shipment reached the destination ramp. Weight certification
was to be made, however, at the time the trailer was tendered to the
originating carrier.'"
The Commission adopted, as rule 8(a), the examiners' recom-
mendation regarding the requirement for a receipt or bill of lading"'
but modified the examiners' recommendations concerning weight and
content certification in a significant respect. The ICC's rule 8(b)
requires a shipper to deliver a manifest only where rates are contingent
upon weight or content, and in such a case the manifest or certification
shall be given the originating carrier within 24 hours after the ship-
ment reaches its destination.' 21
 Further flexibility was thereby built
into the requirements since a load would not have to wait for paper-
work before being transported. However, an important restriction was
designed to protect the railroads. Where weight is necessary to compute
charges, the destination railroad must retain possession of the trailer
until shipper certification is received or it has itself ascertained the
weights.
In its rule 8(e) the Commission, without any exceptions having
been taken by the parties, expanded the examiners' requirement for
tariff clarity in the commodity-mixture rule.' The Commission af-
firmed the examiners' proposal for tariff requirements which stated
clearly and explicitly the terms of such rates but added the further
tariff requirements: that "articles" be defined in the tariff or by refer-
ence to the Uniform Freight Classification (U.F.C.); that the required
shipper certification show the percentage of weight of a given article
to the weight of the entire shipment; and that the railroads provide a
rate to apply if a shipment fails to qualify for the lower mixture rate.'"
While the latter two requirements are largely procedural, the first
117 322 I.C.C. at 373.
118 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1964).
119 For a more detailed discussion of pre-rule billing and notification practices and
the Commission's proposed rules, see 322 I.C.C. at 372-80.
120 49 C.F.R. § 500.8(a) (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 373.
121 49 C.F.R. § 500.8(b) (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 376.
122 49 C.F.R. § 500.8(e) (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 380.
123 Id.
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mentioned requirement is of significance to many shippers. The rule, as
proposed at the commencement of the proceedings, would have defined
commodities under the mixture rule by reference to the commodity
descriptions in the Uniform Freight Classification. The shippers, whose
products are listed under a single item, e.g., fresh meat, though
in the trade products receive more specific classification, e.g., ribs, ham,
etc., contended that using the U.F.C. as a guide would greatly impede
their use of these rates. The examiners agreed with this contention and
found the U.F.C. an inappropriate indexing of commodities. The Com-
mission, while not disagreeing with this conclusion, did feel that there
was sufficient need for definite and ascertainable commodity definitions
so that the railroads should be under explicit compulsion to frame a
rule. Recognizing the difficulties with the U.F.C., the Commission
required reference to "a commodity classification, such as the current
Uniform Freight Classification or a designated tariff . . .'" 24 At this
writing the railroads are in the process of compiling a definitional tariff
to alleviate the problems involved in using U.F.C. and yet to comply
with the Commission's rule.
The examiners' proposed rule 20B would have required shipper
certification that trailers contained no prohibited commodity or any
explosive or dangerous article. 125 In proposed rule 22 the related re-
quirement was imposed that where explosives or other dangerous
articles were being tendered the shipper must certify that he has
complied with the Commission's regulations on explosives and danger-
ous articles. The Commission adopted this latter rule!' In addition
to the certification requirement, the rule requires the shipper to advise
the carrier in advance of such dangerous shipment so that the carrier
can place warning placards on the trailer and properly position it in
the train."' The Commission then struck the portion of rule 20B
requiring certification that there was no dangerous or prohibited com-
modity, as unnecessary.
Providing equipment for the rapidly expanding piggybacking
operations had become a real problem. Ordinary flatcars were adapted
for trailer loading, but proved ineffective. New and longer cars were
built which would hold two trailers and it therefore made good economic
sense to offer the.shipper a rate incentive to tender two trailers at a
time destined for the same terminal point. However, as piggybacking
grew, the railroads became less concerned with a need to place two
124 Id.
125 The reference to prohibited commodities is to items which the railroads had by
tariff refused to haul. These are not items which by statute or regulation the railroads
cannot haul. This being the case, the Commission felt no need for the formality of a rule
and believed the carriers could best police their own tariff prohibitions. 322 I.C.C. at 376.
126 49 C.F.R. § 500.8(d) (1967); 322 I.C.C. at 378-79.
127 Id.
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trailers on each car. 17-8
 They needed operational flexibility to load an
increasing volume of trailers. As a practice, they were loading trailers
in the order in which they were received, and a two-trailer shipment
might be split between different trains and even different days. This
practice was operationally justified since it would have been senseless
for the railroads to gear their loading operations to the arrival of second
trailers. It became apparent that a uniform rule was necessary in order
to avoid discrimination in the handling of trailers.
The rule proposed by the Commission would have required that
the two trailers be tendered on the same day for a shipper to qualify
for the incentive rate. It also made such incentive rates available to
motor carriers as well as shippers. The motor carrier provision was
struck by the examiners in accord with their belief that the Commission
lacked the necessary authority to require the railroads to provide such
service to motor carriers. The rule was further changed by the exam-
iners to define the time span for tendering multiple trailers as that
stated in a tariff, but not to exceed one calendar day.
In the final analysis, the Commission felt that the one-calendar-
day provision was too restrictive for the rail carriers. It modified the
rule to state that "[u] nless a rail carrier by appropriate tariff publication
specifically provides otherwise . . . ," the multiple trailers must be
tendered within one calendar day. 129
 The Commission thus refused to
accept the position of the motor carriers that the two trailers must be
tendered simultaneously. The truckers had argued that the only justifi-
cation for incentive rates was the cost-saving of handling a multiple
trailer shipment rather than a single trailer shipment. Without simul-
taneous tendering, no cost-saving could occur. Therefore, the rule had
to require simultaneous tendering or be unreasonable. The Commis-
sion concluded that this investigation was not a proper proceeding "to
issue a general condemnation of volume rates applicable to TOFC ship-
ments.'" Any future attack upon such incentive rates will have to be
directed against an individual rate item with specific attention to the
costing and compensative aspects of that rate.
The billing and notification rules adopted by the Commission
appear to be generally acceptable in the transportation industry. Realis-
tic certification rules for mixture content and weight, by avoiding the
"8 The examiners suggested that the time may well have arrived when there was no
further economic or operational need to base rates on a two-trailer incentive. This would
appear correct with respect to operations between major terminals. There may still be a
need, however, for the two-trailer incentive with respect to freight originating in smaller
communities.
120 49 C.F.R. § 500.8(c) (1967). The Commission in its discussion of this rule did
not deal with the examiners' conclusions that such rates could not be made available for
motor carriers. However, in light of the Commissions' open-tariff rule 3, multiple trailer
rates are available to motor carriers. See 322 I.C.C. at 376-78.
130 322 I.C.C. at 378.
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prior-to-movement certification, have retained the desired flexibility
without sacrificing the need for truthful reporting of the information.
Prescribing a definitional system to apply to the commodity mixture
rule will alleviate confusion and achieve an ascertainable standard to
guide the parties. And while some doubt has been cast upon the validity
of two-trailer rates, the concept has, by dicta and the formality of a
Commission rule, become more firmly established in the TOFC picture.
2. Tariff Publication and Trailer Leasing—Rule 7. As piggyback
operations burgeoned, another important aspect of the equipment prob-
lem was the need for trailers. This was especially critical in plan III,
under which the shipper was required to provide his own trailer. Ship-
pers did not want to commit capital or enter long-term leases in order
to provide the necessary trailers. They were equally unwilling to stand
the risk of backhauling an empty trailer. The obvious solution was the
trip-lease of a railroad-provided trailer. The potential danger in such
private lease arrangements was that of favoritism to selected shippers.
The Commission's proposed solution was to forbid any railroad leasing
of trailers to shippers, but this met with nearly unanimous opposition
from both the railroads and the shippers. The examiners consequently
rejected the prohibition as unwise and as one which would have
sharply curtailed the growth of plan III. Instead, they aimed their rule
at preventing discriminatory evils and required all leasing arrange-
ments to be published in open tariffs containing all rates, rules and
charges in clear and explicit terms. The Commission incorporated this
provision in its rule 7 (a). 131
The imposition of a tariff-publication requirement was used as a
solution to another TOFC problem. In the development of this new
piggyback concept no sharp lines had been drawn as to the extent or
scope of the service provided. Plan II was thought of as a complete
railroad service at a higher cost, while plan III was thought of as a
limited service at a bargain cost. Actually, however, services other than
mere ramp-to-ramp rail transport were being afforded plan III ship-
pers. The loading and unloading of plan III trailers by the railroads,
as an example, had the effect of expanding the service offered under the
lower plan III rates. Even plan II shippers were seeking a broader
scope of service under the rates provided. For example, they asked for
the delivery of plan II trailers to and from plant sites located long dis-
tances from the terminal, thereby expanding the railroad service be-
yond that intended for plan II. Other problems concerning the scope
of service were: (1) a failure by the railroads to assess demurrage on
shipper-provided trailers; (2) a lack of definition and prescription of
charges for the various services auxiliary to line-haul transportation;
131 49 C.F.R. § 500.7(a) (1967). For a complete discussion of the proposed rules and
the Commission's considerations regarding rule 7, see 322 I.C.C. at 367-72.
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and (3) an ill-defined or nonexistent railroad-allowance system cover-
ing payment to shippers for the TOFC transportation facilities they
furnished.
Rule 7 uses the tariff requirement approach to all of these prob-
lems. It requires the carriers to publish rules, regulations and charges
in open tariffs for: (1) carrier leasing of trailers; (2) services not
included in the rate; (3) leasing of empty trailers from shippers; (4)
paying allowances to shippers for furnishing services or instrumen-
talities included in the rate; (5) defining the geographical area in which
pick-up and delivery will be performed; (6) specifying the extent to
which loading and unloading will be done; and (7) requiring demur-
rage and storage against shipper trailers. The addition of a requirement
for tariff publication of the compensation to be paid when a carrier
leases a shipper's empty trailer is one change of particular interest to
shippers.
The rule adopted differs in important respects from the plan
originally proposed and closely follows the recommendations of the
examiners. As mentioned, the Commission had proposed the total aboli-
tion of trip-leasing. It also would have required the railroads to publish
TOFC rates that would either include pick-up and delivery or be
limited to service between designated railroad terminals when all ser-
vice and equipment is provided by the railroads. This latter proposal
was vigorously opposed and depicted as an unnecessary restriction
upon TOFC development. It was felt that it would tie TOFC service
to rigid prescriptions which would nullify its most basic attraction,
namely, flexibility. Further, it was feared that the rule would end
plan III service. This would result from the rule's requirement that
the rates either include pick-up and/or delivery or provide all equip-
ment and services. If every TOFC all-rail plan had to fall into one or
the other of those rate categories, there would be no plan III.
The examiners agreed with the railroad and shipper opponents of
this rule. They specifically found that it was unreasonable and not in
the public interest. Two rules discussed by the examiners were
designed (1) to require the railroads to provide the designated service,
and simultaneously, (2) to provide that whatever part of that service
was supplied by a shipper would be compensated through a published
tariff allowance. The motor carrier interests favored this approach and
contended that Sections 1(3) and 1(4) of the Interstate Commerce
Act required the railroads to provide a complete service.' They further
contended that section 6(1) requires that rates be definite and certain
132 49 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964); 49 U.S.C. § 1(4) (1964). The motor carriers would
have liked the rule to have been further tightened so that with respect to a given com-
modity, with full equipment and service provided between two points, the carriers could
offer either all-inclusive rates or terminal-to-terminal rates, but not both.
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and that only through the complete service concept could the railroads
comply with this requirement.'" After publishing the complete rate,
the railroads can then enumerate specific allowance payments to be
made to shippers who provide any part of this complete service. Such
a system would also accord with section 15(13) which was designed
.
to cover the payment of all allowances by a rail carrier.'"
The crux of this contention is, of course, that the railroads are
obligated under the Act to provide a complete service. Complete TOFC
service would, the motor carriers argued, include everything from the
loading of a railroad-provided trailer to its unloading at destination.
This contention, however, had been dealt with by the Commission in
Eastern Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n v. Baltimore & affirmed
sub nomine Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. United States,' where the three-
judge district court said:
The requirements of the Act are that the carrier must hold
itself out to furnish the facilities of transportation. It is not
required to furnish facilities to pick up and deliver, unless it
holds itself out to do so. When it does so, it may make a
reasonable charge therefor. Such additional service for such
additional charge then becomes available to all who request
it and are willing to pay for it.
If the carrier wishes to initiate a lesser service for a
lesser price, it may do so."
The Commission correctly agreed with the examiners that the holding
in Eastern Central was dispositive of the contentions being advanced
in this Ex Parte 230 rulemaking proceeding. Since the issue was one
of statutory interpretation and no new factual contentions were being
raised by the motor carriers, the Commission was correct in relying
upon its prior decision as affirmed by the Court. 1 "
It can fairly be concluded that these tariff regulations and leasing
rules were necessary and desirable. The very heart of the Interstate
Commerce Act and the system of railroad regulation is the nondis-
133 Section 6(1) of the Act provides in part that:
Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter shall file with
the Commission . . . schedules showing all rates, fares, and charges for transpor-
tation between different points on its own route and between points on its own
route and points on the route of any other carrier . . . when a through route
and joint rate have been established.
49 U.S.C. § 60) (1964).
134 49 U.S.C. § 15(13) (1964).
133 314 I.C.C. 5 (1961).
130 226 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd per curiam, 379 U.S. 6 (1964).
137 Id. at 324.
138 See 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 18.11 (1958).
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criminatory, even-handed treatment of shippers. As the Supreme
Court declared in United States v. Baltimore & O.R.R.: 139
The Interstate Commerce Act is one of the most com-
prehensive regulatory plans that Congress has ever under-
taken. The first Act, and all amendments to it, have aimed
at wiping out discriminations of all types ... and language of
the broadest scope has been used to accomplish all the pur-
poses of the Act."'
Given this background, it is beyond question that the Comniission
could not tolerate a situation where private arrangements were made
between shippers and carriers. Since both the trailer-leasing prohibition
and the restrictive definition aspects of the originally proposed rules
were eliminated, the resulting rules will benefit shipper and carrier
alike. All aspects of TOFC service will be known and subject to the
tariff protection built into the Act. With such certainty and knowledge,
both carrier and shipper can reach sounder judgments respecting their
individual transportation problems.' 41
3. Judicial Consideration of Rules 7 and 8. The opinion of the
district court in the Santa Fe case devoted almost all of its attention to
the validity of rules 2 and 3. 142 Undoubtedly, these so-called open-tariff
provisions were the most controversial product of the Ex Parte 230
proceedings, and deservedly received the closest consideration. The
railroads, in their complaint before that court, had questioned only two
other of the Commission's rules. They objected to the circuity pro-
visions of rule 5(a), and also to rule 7(a), which required the railroads
to lease trailers to TOFC users in accord with published tariff pro-
visions. The railroads had urged that this latter rule was arbitrary,
ambiguous and beyond the Commission's power. They particularly
complained about the reach of the rule to the leasing by a noncarrier
railroad subsidiary or affiliate.'"
139 333 U.S. 169 (1948).
149 Id. at 175.
141 The carriers themselves recognized the need for nondiscriminatory treatment of
shippers and had commenced publishing rules and regulations in their tariffs. Two com-
missioners felt that both rules 7 and 8 were unnecessary because existing tariffs ade-
quately dealt with the problems and, further, because no specific discriminatory abuses had
been shown. 322 I.C.C. at 385-86.
142 Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 955 (ND. Ill. 1965).
143 Rule 7(a) provides that:
Each railroad performing or holding out to perform TOFC service shall
publish, post, and file tariffs . . . which shall contain in clear and explicit terms
all of the rates and charges for and the rules governing the leasing of equipment
to any person using its TOFC service (whether by the railroad itself or by any
person affiliated with or controlled by the railroad or any agents of the rail-
road). .
49 C.F.R. § 500.7(a) (1967).
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The court did not accept the railroad's argument, but did find that
the rule was ambiguous in that it was not restricted to a lease made for
the purpose of a TOFC shipment. The court indicated that such an
unrestrictive provision would be beyond the Commission's authority,
but that should the lease requirements be limited to TOFC transporta-
tion, then under Section 6(1) of the Act, the Commission would have
the power to require the tariff publication of all charges and rules
concerning the use of trailers as instrumentalities of transportation.
Since the proceeding was being remanded to the Commission in respect
to the open-tariff rules, the court also requested the Commission to
resolve this ambiguity. 144
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the district court's decision,
concentrated exclusively upon the open-tariff issues."' However, the
question concerning the validity of the trailer-leasing rules was brought
to the attention of the Supreme Court, not in any of the three petitions
filed in the American Trucking case, but in a separate appeal brought
by the New York Central Railroad Company. 146 This separate appeal
raised two questions: (I) may the ICC require the tariff publication of
leasing rules; and (2) was the imposition of such rules upon the rail-
roads, without a similar demand upon motor carriers and freight
forwarders who also lease trailers to shippers for piggyback shipments,
an unlawful discrimination against the railroads in violation of the
National Transportation Policy. The Court, per curiam, affirmed those
portions of the judgment of the district court from which appeal was
taken.
Since the New York Central was appealing from that portion of
the district court's opinion which held that, absent the ambiguity, the
ICC had the power to promulgate such a rule, it is settled that the
Commission may impose the trailer-leasing rules. As to the ambiguity
question, it is a fair surmise that rule 7(a) will be read to mean that
leasing rules must be published only in conjunction with TOFC ship-
ments. If a railroad wants to lease its equipment for purposes wholly
unrelated to TOFC movements, however, rule 7 (a) would not require
it to promulgate tariff rules concerning such arrangements.
Aside from the fact that the parties' prime concern was with the
open-tariff question, there was another reason why the trailer leasing
rules received little attention in the courts. The motor carriers, through-
out the Commission proceeding, had taken the position that the trailer-
leasing and tariff publication rules should be established on the princi-
ple that the railroad be required to maintain a complete TOFC service
and then publish allowances to be paid shippers for any part of the
1" 244 F. Supp. at 971.
145 American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S.397 (1967).
140 New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 388 U.S. 445 (1967).
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transportation service of facilities supplied by the shipper. This issue
was authoritatively resolved adversely to the motor carrier position in
1964, prior to the time for filing an appeal from the Ex Parte 230
order!'"
Lack of interest in having judicial review of the billing and notifi-
cation regulations can generally be placed on the relative unimportance
of these rules in their practical application. Also, most of the really
strong opposition to particular features of these rules was resolved at
the Commission level.' The rules originally propounded for the trans-
portation industry were in the main, clear-cut solutions to existing
problems. The remedies proposed were of ten drastic, such as abolishing
trip-leasing. The sure result of this approach was to generate the highly
partisan views of all segments of the industry. In an industry with a
long tradition of regulation and with sophisticated methods of dealing
with and being heard on regulatory problems, this approach worked
well. All views were represented and the Commission had maximum
enlightenment before reaching its conclusions. The results were evident
in a series of billing and tariff rules that were generally acceptable to
shippers and carriers alike.
IV. CONCLUSION
The piggyback case will undoubtedly emerge as one of the truly
important ICC opinions simply because it sets that agency's guide for
an entire area of transportation which is fast emerging as a very im-
portant one. All the problems of TOFC are not solved by these rules,
nor is there any guarantee that all of the rules even properly interrelate.
Problems will continue to exist, and perhaps one or more of the rules
will be changed or even circumvented. One thing is certain, however;
litigation will continue, particularly in the areas where the rules do not
tread, e.g., in costing. Nevertheless, the basic guides are here and, as
important economic criteria, there can be little doubt that their impact
will be felt for some time.
147 Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 318 (WD. Mo. 1964).
144 It should be noted that one dissenting commissioner strongly objected to the
trailer-leasing rule. He believed the record did not support it. More importantly, he felt
that it would jeopardize the railroads' existing trailer investment. This would occur as
nonregulated leasing concerns undercut the railroad tariff terms. The investment of the
New York Central Railroad Company in flexivan equipment was cited as an example.
In that instance his insight was apparently correct, since the New York Central was the
only railroad to appeal, although unsuccessfully, the Commission's trailer-leasing rule.
New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 388 U.S. 445 (1967).
60
BOSTON COLLEGE
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME IX FALL 1967 NUMBER 1   
BOARD OF EDITORS
WILLIAM F. M. HICKS
Editor in Chief
JOHN R. SHAUGHNESSY, JR.
Article and Book Review Editor
DAVID H. CTIAIFETZ
Casenote and Comment Editor
STEVEN C. UNSINO
Symposium Editor
F. ANTHONY MAW
Case Editor
JOHN J. REID
Uniform Commercial Code Editor
SAMUEL P. SEARS, JR.
Casenote and Comment Editor
PETER W. BRADBURY
Managing Editor
JOHN A. DOOLEY III
Legislation Editor
EDITORIAL STAFF
PETER A. AMBROSINI
WALTER ANCOFF
Runs R. BUDD
LAWRENCE T. BENCH
ROBERT S. BLOOM
JOHN R. HICINBOTIIEM
DAVID J. LEVENSON
JAMES A. CHAMPY
RICHARD K. COLE
JOSEPH GOLDBERG
WALTER F. KELLY, JR.
REVIEW STAFF
PETER J. MONTE
THOMAS R. MURTACH
WILLIAM A. RYAN, JR.
JEFFREY M. SIGER
JOSEPH M. KORFF
ANDREW J. NEWMAN
ELIZABETH C. O'NEILL
MITCHELL J. SIKORA
J OSEP II F. SULLIVAN, JR.
ROBERT D. TOBIN
DAVID M. WINER
FACULTY COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATIONS
RICHARD G. HUBER
	 WILLIAM F. WILLIER
Chairman	 Faculty Adviser to the Law Review
FREDERICK M. HART
	
JAMES L. HOUGHTELING
JACQUELINE COOKE
Administrative Assistant
61
